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Abstract. In this paper we try to unify the frameworks of definitions of 
semantic security, indistinguishability and non-malleability by defining 
semantic security in comparison based framework. This facilitates the 
study of relations among these goals against different attack models and 
makes the proof of the equivalence of semantic security and 
indistinguishability easier and more understandable. Besides, our proof of 
the equivalence of semantic security and indistinguishability does not need 
any intermediate goals such as non devidability to change the definition 
framework. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The security of public key cryptosystems can be evaluated as achieving certain 
cryptographic goals such as semantic security, indistinguishability, non-malleability, 
plaintext awareness and non-devidability. In this paper we focus on semantic security 
and indistinguishability which has been defined in [GM84] for the first time. The 
latter is also known as polynomial security or Goldwasser-Micali security. 
Roughly speaking, indistinguishability formalizes an adversary's inability to 
distinguish between two plaintexts given the encryption of one of them. It is rather an 
artificial goal but suggests an applicable method for evaluating security in provable 
security context. On the other hand, an encryption scheme is said to be semantically 
secure if no polynomially bounded adversary can be found to extract any partial 
information about the plaintext of a given ciphertext. Thus semantic security is a 
direct intuition of privacy and comparing whit Shannon's perfect security [S49] it can 
be considered as the computational version of perfect security. Unlike 
indistinguishability, semantic security does not suggest any method for security 
evaluation.  
The term "information" in the definition of semantic security can be modeled by 
functions from message space to *S  in which S  is the alphabet of computation 
model. Proving that no such function exists for a cryptosystem implicitly proves the 
indistinguishability goal for that cryptosystem. Such a close relationship between 
indistinguishability and semantic security was firstly demonstrated in [GM84] as their 
equivalence. In the original definition of semantic security in [GM84] there is no 
restriction on the computability of the functions modeling information about plaintext. 
But as it has bean said in [MRS88] what good would it do any adversary to “guess” a 
function if he can not even verify that his guess is correct. In later formulations of 
semantic security the functions modeling "information" restricted to be polynomially 
verifiable [WSI03]. 
 ?
Another important turning point was introduced in [BDPR98]. Bellare et al. suggested 
that cryptographic goals to be studied in connection with attack models and not in 
isolation. Using this method, relations among indistinguishability and semantic 
security is discussed in [BDPR98] against chosen plaintext attack, non-adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attack and adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. 
Semantic security can be formalized under two different frameworks namely 
simulator based and comparison based. The simulator based definitions requests that 
for any adversary given a ciphertext there exists a poly-time algorithm called a 
simulator which succeeds in the attack (i.e. extracting non negligible information) 
without the ciphertext essentially as well as the adversary. The comparison based 
definition requests that any adversary in possession of the ciphertext obtains no 
advantage over one which performs only random guess. Since random guess can be 
regarded as a special case of simulation the comparison based notion may seem 
stronger than the simulator-based one. On the other hand in the simulator based 
definition there is no restriction on the computability of partial information which an 
adversary whishes to extract while in the comparison based the partial information has 
to be efficiently generated and evaluated by a poly-time algorithm. This may show 
that the former is stronger than the latter. 
In [BDPR98] non-malleability is defined in comparison based framework while in 
previous definitions [DDN95, DDN98] it has bean defined using a simulator. Besides 
in [BDPR98] it has been shown that these two definitions are equivalent. Semantic 
security as defined in [WSI03] is a simulator based one. Using this definition results 
in some contradictions as mentioned above and makes proving the equivalence 
between semantic security and indistinguishability difficult. Besides, the proof of the 
equivalence between semantic security and indistinguishability in this framework 
requires some other artificial security goals such as non-devidability to be defined in 
order to unify the definition frameworks. 
 In this paper using the idea in [BDPR98], we define semantic security in comparison 
based framework and study the relations between semantic security and 
indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack (cpa ), non-adaptive chosen 
ciphertext attack (cca1 ) and adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (cca2 ). Finally we 
suggest a simple and more understandable proof of equivalence of semantic security 
and indistinguishability. 
Figure (1) shows the summary of works done in this category. 
 
 
 
figure (1) Relations among security notions 
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In figure (1) the arrows indicate implication and the hatched arrows indicate the non 
implications. Thus the existence of a path from a pair of goal – attack 11 AG -  to 
22 AG -  shows that if the goal 1G  in a cryptosystem is achieved in the sense of attack 
1A  then goal 2G  is also achieved against attack 2A . For example if a cryptosystem is 
proved to be non-malleable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack then it is 
semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack. 
In section 2 we introduce some preliminary definitions. Then in section 3 we 
introduce our definition of semantic security as well as a slightly modified definition 
of indistinguishability based on comparison and then in section 4 we study our proof 
of equivalence of semantic security and indistinguishability in the new framework. 
 
2 Preliminary definitions 
 
Polynomially verifiable function  
The function *® SM:f is said to be polynomially verifiable if there exists a 
probabilistic poly-time algorithm A such that: 
1))x(f,x(A:Mx =Î"  and 0)y,x(A)x(fy =Þ¹  
In this definition M is the message space and *S  is the whole information about 
plaintext. 
 
Negligible function  
The function RN: ®e  is negligible if  
(1) 0)n(:Nn ³Î" e  
(2) ccc k)k(kkk0c
-<³"'$³" e  
 
Public key encryption scheme  A public key encryption scheme )D,E,K(=P  is a 
triple of algorithms such that: 
(1) The key generation algorithm K  is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm that takes a 
security parameter Nk Î as the input and outputs a pair )sk,pk( of matching public and 
secret keys, 
(2) The encryption algorithm E  is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm that takes a 
public key pk and a message *Î }1,0{x as the input and outputs a ciphertext y , 
(3) The decryption algorithm D  is a deterministic poly-time algorithm that takes a 
secret key sk  and a ciphertext y  as the input and outputs either a message *Î }1,0{x  
or a special symbol o  , if no legal decryption can be found for y . 
 
Adversary Model 
 
An adversary is modeled as a pair of probabilistic poly-time algorithm )A,A(A 21= . 
The exact purpose of each algorithm depends on the particular adversarial goal, but in 
general, in the first stage i.e. using 1A , the adversary given the public key seeks and 
outputs some test instance and in second stage the adversary is issued a challenge 
ciphertext y  generated as a probabilistic function of the test instance in a manner 
depending on the goal. In addition, 1A  can output some state information that will be 
passed to 2A . The adversary )A,A(A 21= is said to be successful if it passes the 
challenge.  
 °
In chosen plaintext attack (CPA ) the adversary can encrypt any arbitrary plaintext 
In non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1 ) we give 1A  (the public key) and 
access to a decryption oracle but we do not allow 2A  access to a decryption oracle. 
Thus the decryption oracle can be used to generate test instance but is taken away 
before the challenge appears. 
In adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2 ) we continue to give 1A  the public key 
and the access to decryption oracle but we also give 2A  the access to the same 
decryption oracle, with the only restriction that the challenge ciphertext cannot be 
queried.   
 
3 Goal definitions 
 
Comparison based semantic security 
 
Let )A,A(A 21=  be an adversary attacking the encryption scheme )D,E,K(=P . The 
adversary in the first phase of attack i.e. using algorithm 1A  takes as the input the 
public key pk  and outputs the pair s)(M,  in which the first component is a message 
space samplable in poly-time and the second component is any information that 
should be delivered from 1A  to 2A . Then a random message Mx Î  is selected and 
encrypted by pkE  to produces the ciphertext y . In the second phase of attack, the 
algorithm 2A  takes as the input the massage space, the state information and the 
challenge ciphertext i.e. )y,s,M(  and outputs the pair )f,v(  and a random MxÎ is 
selected by the algorithm sample  using the information delivered to 2A .  
The algorithm sample  is said to be successful if the random x  that it selects satisfies 
the equation )x(fv = .  
If the difference of the success of the adversary and the algorithm sample  as a 
function of k , the security parameter, is a negligible function, then )D,E,K(=P is 
said to be secure in the sense of CSS_ATK . 
In formal setting let )D,E,K(=P  be an encryption scheme and )A,A(A 21=  be a 
polynomially bounded adversary. For }2cca,1cca,cpa{atk Î  and Nk Î , we define the 
experiments )k(Exp 1atkcss Sample,A,
--
P and )k(Exp
0atkcss
Sample,A,
--
P  as below. 
 
)k(Exp 1atkcss Sample,A,
--
P  
);x(Ey ;Mx );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pk( pk
(.)O
1
1 ¬¬¬¬
);y,s,M(A)f,v( (.)O2 2¬   
1d  then  )x(fv  if ¬=  
;0d  else ¬  
d return  
)k(Exp 0atkcss Sample,A,
--
P  
);s,M(Samplex );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pk( (.)O1 1 ¬¬¬
);s,M(A)f,v( (.)O2 2¬   
1d  then  )x(fv  if ¬=  
;0d  else ¬  
d return  
 ?
In which for any Mx,x Î¢ we have xx ¢= ; and the adversary A  has the oracle access 
to a decryption oracle as below:  
ee =×=×= )(O  and   )(O   then     cpa  atk   if 21 , 
e=××=×= )(O    and  )(D)(O   then   cca1  atk   if 2sk1 , 
)(D)(O    and  )(D)(O   then   cca2  atk   if sk2sk1 ×=××=×=  
but in the case of cca2  atk = , 2A  is not allowed to request the decryption of the 
challenged ciphertext y . 
The advantage of the adversary, )k(Adv atkcss A,A,
-
¢P , is defined to be 
]1)k(ExpPr[]1)k(ExpPr[)k(Adv 0atkcss Sample,A,
1atkcss
Sample,A,
atkcss
Sample,A, =-==
-----
PPP  
The public key encryption scheme )D,E,K(=P  is secure in the sense of CSS_ATK  if 
negligible is )k(Adv : S   A atkcss Sample,A,
-$" P . 
We can unify the two experiments above in the following experiment: 
 
For }2cca,1cca,cpa{atk Î  and }1,0{b Î  and Nk Î we define 
)k(Exp batkcss Sample,A,
--
P  
);s,M(Samplex );x(Ey ;Mx );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pk( 01pk1
(.)O
1
1 ¬¬¬¬¬
);y,s,M(A)f,v( (.)O2 2¬  
;1d then  )x(fv  if b ¬=  
;0d  else ¬  
d return  
 
Indistinguishability 
 
Let )D,E,K(=P  be an encryption scheme and )A,A(A 21= be a polynomially 
bounded adversary. For }2cca,1cca,cpa{atk Î  and Nk Î  and }1,0{b Î , we define  
)k(Exp batkindA,
--
P  as below: 
 
)k(Exp batkindA,
--
P  
);x(Ey );pk(A)s,x,x(  );k(K)sk,pk( bpk
(.)O
110
1 ¬¬¬  
);y,s,x,x(Ad 10
(.)O
2
2¬   
d return  
 
In which for any Mx,x Î¢ we have xx ¢= ; and the adversary A  has the oracle access 
to a decryption oracle as below:  
ee =×=×= )(O  and   )(O   then     cpa  atk   if 21 , 
e=××=×= )(O    and  )(D)(O   then   cca1  atk   if 2sk1 , 
)(D)(O    and  )(D)(O   then   cca2  atk   if sk2sk1 ×=××=×=  
but in the case of cca2  atk = , 2A  is not allowed to request the decryption of the 
challenged ciphertext y . 
The advantage of the adversary which is a criterion of its correct guess is defined as 
the difference of the probability of outputting a correct 1  and a wrong 1 .  
In a formal setting the advantage of the adversary is formulated as below: 
]1)k(ExpPr[]1)k(ExpPr[)k(Adv 0atkindA,
1atkind
A,
atkind
A, =-==
-----
PPP  
 ?
The public key encryption scheme )D,E,K(=P is said to be secure in the sense of 
IND_ATK  if  
.negligible is  )k(Adv  A atkind A,PE
-"  
 
4 Equivalence between semantic security and indistinguishability 
 
Theorem 1: 
The public key encryption scheme )D,E,K(=P  is secure in the sense of CSS_ATK  if 
and only if it is secure in the sense of IND_ATK , for any attack 
}2CCA,1CCA,CPA{ATK Î .  
Proof: 
First we prove the "if" part of the theorem, namely ATK_INDATK_CSS Þ : 
Suppose )D,E,K(=P  is a public key encryption scheme that is secure in the sense of 
CSS_ATK  but it is not secure in the sense of IND_ATK . Thus, according to the 
definition of indistinguishability (section 3) there exists a poly-time adversary 
)A,A(A 21=  being able to distinguish between ciphertexts of some plaintexts from 
message space. Using )A,A(A 21=  as a subroutine, we construct the poly-time 
adversary )B,B(B 21=  that can extract some non-negligible information about 
plaintext from its corresponding ciphertext. 
Constructing B  is straight forward; every poly-time algorithm that can distinguish 
between ciphertexts Mx,x 10 Î , will predict the value of the following function: 
{
1
0
10
xx
xx
if
if
1
0
)x(f
}1,0{}x,x{:f
=
=
=
®
 
Thus the adversary )B,B(B 21=  can be defined formally as bellow: 
 
)pk(B )(O1 1
×  
)pk(A)s,x,x( (.)O110 1¬ ; }x,x{M 10¬ ; 
s)(M,  return  
)y,s,M(B )(O2 2
×  
)y,s,x,x(Ad 10
(.)O
2
2¬ ; dv ¬  
{
1
0
10
xx
xx
if
if
1
0
)x(f
}1,0{}x,x{:f
=
=
=
®
 
f)(v,  return  
 
Since 1A  and 2A  are poly-time algorithms, so are 1B  and 2B .  
We define )b(p and )b(p ¢ as bellow: 
);x(Ey ;Mx );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pkPr[()b(p 1pk1
(.)O
1
R 1 ¬¬¬¾¾¬=
)]x(fv : )y,s,M(A)f,v( );s,M(Samplex b
(.)O
20
2 =¬¬  
 );x(Ey ;Mx );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pkPr[( 1pk1
(.)O
1
R 1 ¬¬¬¾¾¬=
)]x(fv : )y,s,M(A)f,v( );s,M(Samplex 1
(.)O
20
2 =¬¬  
 `
 );x(Ey );pk(A)s,x,x( );k(K)sk,pkPr[()b(p bpk
(.)O
110
R 1 ¬¬¾¾¬=¢  
1]d :)y,s,x,x(Ad 10
(.)O
2
2 =¬  
Now, since the function f  is a deterministic one, the probability that )x(fv 1= equals 
to the probability that 1d = . So  )b(p  and )b(p¢  will be equal and according to the 
definition of the advantage of the adversary we will have: 
)k(Adv)0(p)1(p)0(p)1(p)k(Adv atkindA,
atkcss
A,
-- =¢-¢=-= PP  
So, whenever )k(Adv atkindA,
-
P is not a non-negligible function, neither is )k(Adv
atkcss
A,
-
P . 
Now we proof the other side of the theorem, namely ATK_CSSATK_IND Þ : 
Our proof is again by contradiction. 
Suppose )B,B(B 21=  is an adversary attacking semantic goal of the cryptosystem, i.e. 
can extract some non-negligible information about plaintext from its corresponding 
ciphertext. We construct the adversary )A,A(A 21= to attack the indistinguishability 
goal of the cryptosystem by using )B,B(B 21=  as a subroutine. 
The adversary )A,A(A 21=  is defined as bellow: 
 
)pk(A )(O1 1
×  
;Mx,x  );pk(B)s,M( 10
(.)O
1
1 ¬¬  
)s,x,(x  return 10   
)y,s,x,x(A 10
)(O
2
2 ×  
)y,s,M(B)f,v( (.)O2 2¬ ; 
0;d then  )x(fv  if 0 ¬=  
;1d then  )x(fv  if 1 ¬=  
};1,0{d  else R¾¾¬  
d  return  
  
Now if the function f  is a polynomially verifiable function, the algorithms 1A  and 
2A run in polynomial time. 
Again for }1,0{bÎ we define )b(p and )b(p ¢ as bellow: 
 
 );x(Ey );pk(A)s,x,x( );k(K)sk,pkPr[()b(p bpk
(.)O
110
R 1 ¬¬¾¾¬=
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2
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 );x(Ey ;Mx );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pkPr[()b(p 1pk1
(.)O
1
R 1 ¬¬¬¾¾¬=¢
)]x(fv  : )y,s,M(A)f,v( );s,M(Samplex b
(.)O
20
2 =¬¬  
 );x(Ey ;Mx );pk(A)s,M( );k(K)sk,pkPr[( 1pk1
(.)O
1
R 1 ¬¬¬¾¾¬=
)]x(fv  : )y,s,M(A)f,v( );s,M(Samplex 1
(.)O
20
2 =¬¬  
 
The algorithm 1A  outputs the value 1  in the cases bellow: 
If )x(fv 1= and )x(fv 0¹  the output will deterministically be 1 . 
If )x(fv 1¹ and )x(fv 0¹  the output will be 1  by the probability 2
1 . 
Thus we have 
 ´
))0(p)1(p(
2
1
2
1
)))0(p1))(1(p1()0(p)1(p(
2
1
))0(p1)(1(p)1(p ¢-¢+=¢-¢-+¢¢+¢-¢=  
So, 
)k(Adv)0(p)1(p1)1(p2)0(p)1(p)k(Adv atkcssA,
atkind
A,
-- =¢-¢=-=-= PP  
Now whenever )k(Adv atkcssA,
-
P is not non-negligible function, so is )k(Adv
atkind
A,
-
P . 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we formulized semantic security in comparison based framework. This 
unifies the definition frameworks of semantic security and indistinguishability and 
facilitates the study of relations between indistinguishability and semantic security 
against chosen plaintext attack, non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attack removing the contradictions that was mentioned in the 
introduction. Then we suggested a simple proof for the equivalence of semantic 
security and indistinguishability in the new setting. Our proof is more understandable 
than previous ones and does not need any intermediate goals such as non-devidability 
to be defined for definition framework unification. 
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